The aim of this paper is to evaluate etiological accounts of functions for the domain of technical artefacts. Etiological theories ascribe functions to items on the basis of the causal histories of those items; they apply relatively straightforwardly to the biological domain, in which neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory provides a well-developed and generally accepted background for describing the causal histories of biological items. Yet there is no well-developed and generally accepted theory for describing the causal history of artefacts, so the application of etiological theories to the technical domain is hardly straightforward. In this paper we consider the transposition of etiological theories in general from the biological to the technical domain. We argue that a number of etiological theories that appear defensible for biology become untenable for technology. We illustrate our argument by showing that the standard etiological accounts of Neander and Millikan, and some recent attempts to improve on them, provide examples of such untenable theories.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to evaluate etiological accounts of functions for the domain of technical artefacts. Etiological theories generally ascribe functions Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 54 (2003) , 261-289, axg012 to items on the basis of the causal histories of those items. For the biological domain, the causal histories of items are described in terms of genetic reproduction and natural selection, in the well-developed and generally accepted framework of neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory. The two standard etiological theories, formulated by Karen Neander ([1991a] , [1991b] ) and Ruth Garrett Millikan ([1984] , [1993] ), are based on these neo-Darwinian causal histories. Neander identifies the proper functions of items with the physical dispositions for which these items were selected. 1 Millikan identifies the (direct) proper functions of items with the reproduced physical dispositions that causally contribute to the existence of the items. In this way they both erect extensive and systematic theories of functions on a lucid and solid neo-Darwinian basis, which primarily applies to the biological domain.
Etiological accounts apply less straightforwardly to the domain of technical artefacts. One can, of course, describe the causal history of an artefact, but there is as yet no well-developed and generally accepted theory that underlies these descriptions. Technical counterparts to neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory exist which describe the causal histories of artefacts in terms of reproduction and selection (e.g., Basalla [1988] ; Ziman [2000] ), but these counterparts are tentative or controversial. Despite this lack of a welldeveloped and generally accepted description of causal histories of artefacts, Neander and Millikan transpose their accounts to the technical domain.
The possibility of this transposition of etiological theories from the biological to the technical domain is the main subject of this paper. A naive transposition would presuppose that artefacts have causal histories of reproduction and selection; then, one could identify the proper functions of an artefact with, again, either the dispositions for which the artefact was selected or the dispositions that causally contributed to its existence: but even if the concepts of reproduction and selection are applicable in the context of technology, they have a different meaning than found in a biological context. Technical reproduction and selection involve intentional behaviour by agents, whereas it is regarded as one of the triumphs of Darwinism that it describes reproduction and selection in non-intentional terms. Moreover, selection in the technical domain can be understood in a narrow and a broad sense. Narrowly construed, selection is a one-shot process in which a single artefact is selected by an agent (as in 'the builder chose tar to seal the roof'). Broadly understood, it is a repetitive process that involves many similar artefacts selected by many agents (as in 'cellular phones rapidly conquered the telecom market'). In neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, selection has only the broader meaning of repetitive selection. A sophisticated transposition of etiological theories to the technical domain should pay attention to the shift in the terminology used for describing the causal histories of artefacts and for identifying their functions.
In this paper, we present a general analysis and critical appraisal of etiological theories for the technical domain. The analysis focuses on the causal histories that etiological theories presuppose and on their identification of functions. As part of this analysis, we divide etiological theories into four general classes. Intuitively, two of these classes contain etiological theories for biological items and the other two contain the theories for artefacts. We use this classification as a tool to study the consequences of transposing etiological theories from the biological to the technical domain. After discussing this transposition, we evaluate the resulting etiological theories for the technical domain. We argue that all etiological theories in one of the two 'biological' classes are inadequate as conceptual analyses of function ascriptions in this domain, and we show that members of the remaining class may also fail in this respect. These template criticisms are illustrated and developed by analysing the way in which Neander and Millikan-unsuccessfully, as we argue-apply their standard etiological theories to artefacts. Finally, we consider two recent attempts, by Beth Preston ([1998] ) and Paul Sheldon Davies ([2000] , [2001] ), to improve existing etiological accounts by combining them with a non-etiological theory of functions. We argue that these attempts also fail to lead to theories of artefact functions that provide an adequate conceptual analysis.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We start by describing some aspects of the phenomenology of artefact use in Section 2. We introduce four desiderata for a theory of functions that are sufficient to reproduce some central aspects of this phenomenology. In Section 3, we give a general characterisation of etiological theories and develop our classification. Then, in Section 4, we present a general argument to prove that all members of two classes of etiological theories fail to satisfy the desiderata of Section 2. We also show that some members of the other classes of etiological theories fail to meet these desiderata. In Sections 5 and 6, we illustrate these arguments by describing how Neander and Millikan apply their standard etiological theories to artefacts. The hybrid theories of functions developed by Preston and Davies are the topic of Section 7. We draw our conclusions in Section 8.
Desiderata for theories of functions
In this section, we do three things. First, we investigate some of the phenomenology of artefact use. We consider only artefacts that belong to the technical domain, i.e., artefacts that are made and used primarily for practical purposes. We then show that the concept of function can play a role in describing artefact use if the underlying theory of functions satisfies a number of constraints. In this way, we outline the material which an etiological theory of functions should analyse and accommodate if it is to be an adequate conceptual analysis. Finally, we generalise the constraints and obtain four desiderata for theories of functions.
We start by describing some situations or phenomena in which technical artefacts play a role. These phenomena have been chosen for their simplicity and intuitive appeal rather than their richness of detail.
A. John stands on a folding chair to clean the top shelves of his kitchen cupboards. A concerned neighbour comes by and warns him that the chair is not for standing on, but for sitting on. The neighbour advises John to use a small stepladder instead. John curtly replies that his stepladder is broken and that he has to make do with the chair.
B. John wants to put up his tent, but notices that the pegs are missing. He therefore looks through his things and collects alternatives. He chooses items such as large nails and thick wooden pins because they are elongated and resist some bending. When John finally puts up his tent, some of the wooden pins break, but the nails work.
C. In the 1910s, John, an office clerk, comes across a curious device on the desk of one of his co-workers: it looks like a typewriter with a telephone attached to it. Asking his colleague how she managed to merge both artefacts, she tells him that the device is neither a telephone nor a typewriter. It is a teletypewriter, a recent invention that can be used to transmit texts by means of signals resembling Morse code.
These phenomena can be formulated in terms of functions. In case A, John uses the folding chair in such a way that it has the function of supporting standing people, but his neighbour claims that it has the function of supporting sitting rather than standing people. He says that stepladders have the latter function; John replies that his stepladder cannot perform its function. In case B, John is looking for things that can have the function of tent pegs. He chooses wooden pins and nails because they have a physical structure that may make them suitable for performing this function. In case C, John is informed that the strange device is for transmitting texts-unlike a telephone, which is for transmitting sounds, and unlike a typewriter, which is for typing texts with.
So some of the phenomenology of artefact use can be cast in terms of functions. If we accept this, we can formulate certain constraints or criteria of adequacy for theories of artefact functions. Cases A and B can be described by requiring that (1) in some cases, theories of functions make a distinction between functions of an artefact that are proper to the artefact and functions for which the artefact can be used but that are not proper to it. Another aspect of case A is captured if (2) an artefact can sometimes not perform its proper function(s). The theory is adequate to case B if (3) not every artefact is suitable to perform a given function and the physical structure of an artefact can provide evidence of the capacity to perform a proper or accidental function. Finally, adequacy to case C is guaranteed if (4) an innovative or even unique artefact can have a (proper) function.
We generalise the above constraints and impose the following four desiderata to any theory of functions for the technical domain: 2 D1. Proper versus accidental: A theory of functions should distinguish between the proper and accidental function(s) of an artefact. Proper functions can typically be understood as functions ascribed standardly to the artefact, whereas accidental functions are ascribed only occasionally. 3 D2. Malfunction: A theory of functions should admit an ascription of proper functions to malfunctioning artefacts, i.e., artefacts that are unable to perform their functions. 4 D3. Physical structure: A theory of functions should entail that for every function there exist structural conditions sufficient for its performance.
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Ascribing Functions to Technical Artefacts 265 2 Our choice of these four desiderata is motivated by our aim to evaluate the application of etiological theories of functions to the technical domain. Given this aim, the choice of D1 and D2 is appropriate because these desiderata are generally accepted as applying to etiological function theories by the participants in the debate concerning these theories. Desideratum D3 captures the way in which functions come about in the technical domain. Desideratum D4 is chosen because D1, D2 and D3 alone do not yet make a theory of functions adequate to the phenomenology of artefact use; D4 in that sense completes these three desiderata. In the context of this paper, we take these desiderata as necessary conditions on theories of functions that are adequate to the phenomena of artefact use. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that in other contexts alternative choices of desiderata may be more appropriate and that there may exist other sets of desiderata that make theories adequate to these phenomena. 3 This formulation admits the possibility of intermediate types of functions: the proper/ accidental distinction need not be exhaustive. If, for instance, the 'standardly'-clause in the characterisation of proper functions is interpreted in terms of designers' intentions, functions ascribed to artefacts by groups of users-'socially accepted' functions, so to say-is such an intermediate type. 4 In its present form, this desideratum conceals a type/token ambiguity: we may wish to ascribe to either an entire class of artefacts (say, badly designed cigarette lighters), or to one specific artefact (say, a broken cigarette lighter), functions that they or it cannot perform. A theory may satisfy one of these sub-desiderata without satisfying the other. This distinction is not commonly noticed in the literature; we thank Maarten Franssen for drawing our attention to it. However, none of our arguments concerning specific existing theories requires a distinction between the two malfunction desiderata. 5 The first part of D3 expresses the intuition that not every artefact can perform a given function.
The function of lifting a sunk submarine from the bottom of the sea, for instance, cannot be performed by a sugar cube. It also implies that some artefacts can perform this given function, namely artefacts that satisfy certain structural conditions. It need not be possible to specify necessary conditions for having a function. For the function of cutting cheese, for instance, both the conditions that describe a steel knife and those that describe a nylon string are sufficient, but neither is necessary, nor is their conjunction.
Moreover, if a theory ascribes a function to an artefact, it should provide partial 6 justification for the belief that the physical structure of the artefact satisfies such conditions. D4. Novelty: A theory of functions should admit an ascription of proper functions to innovative or atypical artefacts.
We introduce etiological theories of functions in the next section, and in Section 4 we start evaluating these theories on the basis of our four desiderata.
Etiological theories in general
There are many different etiological theories in the literature. In this section, we point out the common core of these theories and discuss their divergent aims. We then divide etiological theories into four classes, for the purpose of characterising the consequences of applying etiological theories to the technical domain. Given this purpose, our classification is intended to be as general as possible and is not limited to existing etiological theories.
Common core and divergent aims
Etiological theories ascribe functions to an item I on the basis of the item's causal history ch(I ). This is a very broad characterisation, but it makes clear that etiological theories are 'backward-looking': they look at the history of an item, not its present role or its contribution to a future state of affairs. Proponents of etiological theories can be rather liberal about what they include in the causal history of an item. Some of them include reasons in their historical accounts of the existence of items; 7 others, such as Millikan ([1984], p. 17, [1993] , p. 33), combine an etiological theory of functions with philosophical naturalism. The common core, i.e. the emphasis on causal history, conceals a number of methodological differences; here, we mention two. Some authors intend their theory to be a conceptual analysis of some domain or domains. People routinely speak about the function of our lungs, a tin opener, a work of art, or initiation rites; the goal of etiological theories as conceptual analysis is to capture as much as possible of this ordinary parlance and to make it more precise. Other authors, such as Millikan ([1989] ), claim that their theories are stipulations for some other philosophical goal. In this paper, we treat every etiological theory as if it were intended as conceptual analysis.
Another difference concerns the scope of the etiological theory. Millikan's primary goal is to formulate a naturalistic semantics, in which a notion of proper function bridges the gap between evolutionary theory and linguistics. That the theory can ascribe proper functions to technical artefacts is presented as a beneficial side-effect (e.g., Millikan [1984], pp. 21, 23, 28, 49) . Other authors, such as Paul Griffiths ([1993] ) and Peter Godfrey-Smith ([1994] ), explicitly restrict their theories to biology. Given our interest in the technical domain and the lack of theories exclusive to it, we study only the general etiological theories of Millikan, Neander, Preston, and Davies in this paper.
Although they share the emphasis they put on the causal history of an item, etiological theories differ in the way they ascribe functions on the basis of this history. In the following subsections we introduce two mutually independent distinctions and classify etiological theories using these distinctions. First, we distinguish reproduction etiological theories from non-reproduction theories; then we distinguish intentionalist etiological theories from non-intentionalist theories.
Reproduction versus non-reproduction etiological theories
Our first distinction is between reproduction and non-reproduction etiological theories. An etiological theory is a reproduction etiological theory if it ascribes functions to items on the basis of a specific type of causal history that we call a 'genetic reproduction' history; we call all other theories nonreproduction etiological theories.
Below we give a precise definition of a genetic reproduction history. One can take it roughly to be a causal history ch(I ) in which an item I is described as the reproduction of an ordered sequence of ancestors of I by a genetic copying mechanism. Examples of such genetic reproduction histories abound in biology and technology. In neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, the causal histories that lead to, say, biological organs are taken to comprise a chain of reproduced predecessors of those organs. The mechanism that gives rise to this chain of organs is the copying of the genetic DNA code. In technology, the causal histories of redesigned artefacts and of artefacts that have been slowly developed by trial and error comprise similar chains of reproduced earlier models. In these last cases, an underlying genetic copying mechanism seems lacking. There are, however, authors who have proposed evolutionary theories for technology, according to which the causal histories of artefacts also comply to a genetic structure. Some of these authors identify the genetic code for artefacts by using the notion of memes (Dawkins [1976] ), but as yet there is no consensus about what to take as artefact-genes; compare, for instance, the different contributions to Ziman ([2000] ). It is not difficult to contrast these examples of reproduction histories in biology and technology with causal histories that do not involve reproduction, such as the growth of muscles due to physical exercise, and the building of a chair on the basis of a wish to sit, a blueprint of a chair and construction materials.
Reproduction etiological theories identify the proper function of an item I with those reproduced physical dispositions of the ancestors of I that causally contributed to the existence of I. A biological heart, for instance, is ascribed the function to pump blood because the predecessors of that heart had pumping blood as a reproduced disposition, and because this disposition causally contributed to the reproduction of these predecessors and thus to the existence of the heart in question. Similarly, a car is ascribed the function of transporting people because earlier models of the car had transporting people as a reproduced disposition, and because this disposition causally contributed to the reproduction of these models and to the existence of the car. Nonreproduction theories do not refer to an item's ancestors to distinguish an item's functions from its other dispositions. An example of a nonreproduction etiological theory is one that ascribes to a chair the function of supporting sitting people because it is deliberately constructed for this purpose.
Our precise characterisation of reproduction theories runs as follows. Genetic reproduction histories satisfy three requirements. First, the causal history ch(I ) of an item I must include items that are ancestors of I. Let A, A 0 , A 00 etc. denote these ancestors. Let I be the direct descendant ('reproduction') of A, let A be the direct descendant of A 0 , etc. In many cases, the causal connection between item and ancestor is indirect. In the biological case, for instance, organs are connected to their ancestors through reproduction of a genetic code. This code produced the ancestor, was then copied and, finally, this copy produced the item. Let i be the genetic code that produced I, a the genetic code that produced A, a 0 the code that produced A 0 , etc. The causal history ch(I ) then has the following genetic reproduction structure: I is produced by a genetic code i; this code was produced by an ancestor genetic code a, which also produced the ancestor item A; the code a was produced by its ancestor genetic code a 0 , which also produced A 0 , etc. To accommodate the case that I was directly produced by its ancestors without a 'genetic detour', the items I, A, A 0 . . . may be identical to the genetic codes i, a, a 0 . . ., respectively. (In this latter case it is appropriate to speak about 'reproduction histories' simpliciter.) The structure of a genetic reproduction history is represented in Figure 1 . In this figure, only two of the many processes in this history are indicated, for which we will formulate requirements below. The ! arrows in this picture represent the processes by which the genetic code produces an item, and the ) arrows represent the copying of the genetic code. This structure most clearly applies to biological items; but, as noted above, artefacts can be taken as the expressions of Dawkinian memes. The histories of medieval folk tales may provide another non-biological example, if one regards them as sequences of similar stories based on relatively constant themes and plots that have been handed down from generation to generation. The copying of the word 'dog' is an example in which the genetic detour is avoided. In this last example the copying processes ) can be different mechanisms, such as copying by hand, by print or by photocopiers. This plurality allowed for non-biological reproduction is absent in the biological copying processes of DNA molecules.
The other two requirements on genetic reproduction histories impose further conditions on this genetic structure. Our second requirement is that the direct ancestors A and A 0 , A 0 and A 00 etc. must be at least pair-wise similar: the ancestors must form a sequence of similar or slowly changing items. The item I itself is exempted from this requirement, to allow the theory to ascribe functions to a malformed item, i.e., an item I that is morphologically dissimilar to its ancestors A, A 0 etc. Think, for instance, of a sequence of healthy hearts that ends with a malformed heart. This malformed heart is still considered to be a reproduction of the healthy hearts and a function can be ascribed to it on this basis.
Thirdly, the processes that link the genetic codes (the processes ')' in Figure 1 ) must be counterfactual-supporting copying processes, i.e., the code i should be (nearly) identical to a, the code a should be (nearly) identical to a 0 , and so on, and if a were different, i would differ accordingly, and so on. A theory without this additional requirement may lead to counterintuitive ascriptions of proper functions. Imagine a family of an item I and ancestors A, A 0 . . . without a genetic detour and without counterfactual-supporting pair-wise similarities between the items. An example could be a family consisting of a sweater (I ) with a colour accidentally matching that of strawberries (A, A 0 . . .). Ascribing a proper function to the sweater by inclusion in this family would sit uneasily with our idea of a reproduction relation-which should connect family members. If we disregard this problem, we would be forced to ascribe the proper function of attracting fruit-eating animals to the strawberry-red sweater, which is highly counterintuitive.
Summing up, reproduction etiological theories ascribe functions to an item on the basis of a genetic reproduction history. This type of causal history ch(I ) satisfies three requirements, which serve to explicate partly what we mean by 'reproduction': R1. Genetic structure: it must be possible to describe ch(I ) in terms of processes i ! I, a ! A, a 0 ! A 0 , . . ., which start with the genetic codes i, a, a 0 . . . and end with I and its ancestors A, A 0 , . . ., respectively, where the genetic codes are connected by processes a ) i, a 0 ) a, . . . .
R2. Ancestor similarity:
The ancestor item A should be similar to its direct ancestor A 0 , the item A 0 should be similar to its direct ancestor A 00 , and so on.
R3. Counterfactual genetic reproduction:
The processes a ) i, a 0 ) a, . . . which connect the genetic codes should be (nearly) counterfactual copying processes.
Intentionalist versus non-intentionalist etiological theories
A second distinction is that between intentionalist and non-intentionalist etiological theories. An etiological theory is an intentionalist etiological theory if and only if it ascribes functions to items I on the basis of causal histories ch(I ) that necessarily involve intentional behaviour by agents. A non-intentionalist etiological theory ascribes functions to items on the basis of causal histories which possibly, but not necessarily, involve intentional behaviour.
Examples of causal histories that involve necessarily intentional behaviour are the deliberate breeding of dogs and the deliberate copying of linguistic signs. Examples of non-intentionalist causal histories are the copying of DNA molecules and the accidental collapse of a bridge. An example of an intentionalist etiological theory is the ascription to a dog of the function of guiding blind people on the basis of a breeder's intention to raise a guide dog. An example of a non-intentionalist etiological theory is ascribing to DNA molecules the function of transmitting genetic information on the basis of neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory.
The distinction between intentionalist and non-intentionalist theories may not be as sharp as that between reproduction and non-reproduction theories. After all, the characterisation of certain causal histories as 'necessarily involving' intentional behaviour by agents leaves room for gradations. Take, for instance, the example of linguistic behaviour: this necessarily involves some intentional behaviour, but is not entirely the product of it; it involves a good deal of conditioning of unintentional behaviour and perhaps some innate linguistic mechanisms as well. For our purposes, however, a grey-tone distinction is as useful as a black-and-white one. Our results apply as long as there is some distinction.
Problems for etiological theories in the technical domain
In the previous section, we introduced etiological theories in general. In the present section, we add criticism. We argue that reproduction etiological theories fail to account for the phenomenology of artefact use and that nonreproduction etiological theories need to satisfy additional constraints if they, too, are not to fail.
With our distinctions between different types of causal histories in hand, we characterise the extension to the technical domain of standard etiological theories for the biological domain as follows. Standard etiological theories are non-intentionalist reproduction theories. They are reproduction theories because they identify the functions of organs with those dispositions of predecessor organs that were the cause of their reproduction, and because the causal history of organs has the structure of a genetic reproduction history. They are non-intentionalist because these genetic reproduction histories do not necessarily involve intentional behaviour of agents. An etiological theory for the technical domain appears to be intentionalist, because the causal histories of artefacts necessarily involve intentional behaviour by agents; technical artefacts are, as we stipulated at the beginning of Section 2, objects that are made and used. Hence, if standard etiological theories for the biological domain are applied to the technical domain, one has to transform them from non-intentionalist into intentionalist reproduction theories. However, as we argue below, reproduction theories (whether intentionalist or not) do not satisfy the desiderata D1 to D4 for theories of functions in the technical domain. Therefore, an acceptable theory for the technical domain is necessarily an intentionalist non-reproduction theory. So if standard etiological theories for the biological domain are applied to the technical domain, they have to be transformed from non-intentionalist reproduction to intentionalist non-reproduction theories (see Figure 2) .
In Sections 5 and 6 we indicate the ways in which Neander and Millikan bring about this double transformation, and show how this undermines the adequacy of their theories for the technical domain. In this section we continue our general discussion of etiological theories in more detail.
As discussed in Section 2, a theory of function is adequate for the technical domain if it satisfies the four desiderata D1 to D4. On the basis of the general description of etiological theories given in the previous section, we are not yet in a position to give a full assessment of these theories, but it appears that reproduction theories satisfy the first two desiderata. A reproduction theory can distinguish an item's proper functions from other dispositions by referring to the history of selection. Indeed, many etiologists note that they wish to make such a distinction.
8 Furthermore, the malfunction desideratum D2 is so often used by etiologists to pummel their opponents that it would be rather embarrassing if their own theories did not fulfil it. 9 Rather sketchily, we can say that in the genetic reproduction scheme, an item's functions need only correspond to actual dispositions of its ancestors, not to actual dispositions of its own. Some proponents of reproduction etiological theories formulate this alleged fulfilment of the first two desiderata as adequacy to the 'normative aspects' of the notion of function (Neander [1991a] , pp. 180-1; Preston [1998] , pp. 224-5). Let us agree that reproduction etiological theories satisfy the former two desiderata. This leaves open the question whether they satisfy the latter two; in the remainder of this section, we show through a two-stage argument that only a specific class of etiological theories satisfies the last two desiderata.
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Pieter E. Vermaas and Wybo Houkes First, we argue that reproduction etiological theories may satisfy the physical structure desideratum D3 but fail to satisfy the novelty desideratum D4. Then, we argue that intentionalist non-reproduction etiological theories may ignore the relation between functions and physical structure but are able to ascribe proper functions to innovative and atypical artefacts. Intentionalist nonreproduction etiological theories can thus meet D4 but do not always meet D3.
Let us survey the details of the first step of our argument. Consider a reproduction etiological theory. As explained in Section 3, such a theory ascribes a proper function to an item I on the basis of the physical structure of its ancestors A, A 0 , . . ., namely certain reproduced physical dispositions. Furthermore, both I and its ancestors are part of a genetic reproduction history (requirement R1) and are thus products of processes ('!' in Figure 1 ) that start with genetic codes. These genetic codes are connected by processes (')' in Figure 1 ) that are nearly counterfactual copying processes (requirement R3). Hence, these codes are nearly identical. Let's now assume that the processes '!' which produce the item I and its ancestors of the basis of these codes are similar. This assumption guarantees that the physical structure of I is approximately similar to the physical structure of those ancestors, including the dispositions that correspond to the proper functions ascribed to I. Only malformed, and consequently malfunctioning, items are an exception to this guarantee. Hence, if the mentioned assumption holds, reproduction etiological theories meet the physical structure desideratum D3: by identifying a function with a specific physical disposition, the theory entails that sufficient structural conditions exist for the ancestors A, A 0 , . . . for performing that function-the physical structure should be such that it actually possesses that disposition; furthermore, the genetic structure of the causal history provides partial justification for the belief that the artefact I has the physical disposition that corresponds to the ascribed function.
There is some ground to accept the mentioned assumption that the processes '!' which yield the item I and its ancestors of the basis of these codes are similar. The ancestors A, A 0 , . . . had a similar structure (requirement R2) and were the products of these processes and approximately identical genetic codes. This supports the assumption that these processes were also similar. The assumption can be imposed on genetic reproduction histories as a fourth requirement R4.
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R4. Item production similarity: The processes i ! I, a ! A, . . . which produce the item I and its ancestors A, A 0 , . . . should be relevantly similar.
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Reproduction etiological theories which ascribe functions to items on the basis of causal history that satisfies the requirements R1 to R3 as well as this new requirement all meet the physical structure desideratum D3. This strong connection between the proper functions of I and dispositions of the ancestors A, A 0 , . . . has an important drawback: reproduction etiological theories can ascribe to an item only proper functions that correspond to dispositions of these ancestors. If a creative engineer intentionally designs an innovative artefact, then there are by definition no ancestors with corresponding dispositions. Hence, reproduction etiological theories cannot ascribe any proper function to an innovative artefact. According to reproduction etiological theories, the disposition of the first time-travelling device to transport people through time would be a mere accidental role, not a (proper) function. Reproduction etiological theories thus do not satisfy the novelty desideratum D4: innovative artefacts do not have proper functions, because of the sheer lack of ancestors.
Let us turn to the other class of etiological theories, the non-reproduction theories. These theories do not insist on a genetic reproduction history and, consequently, cannot forge a strong link between the proper functions of I and dispositions of ancestors of I. Hence, non-reproduction etiological theories may ascribe proper functions to innovative and/or atypical artefacts. To give but one example: a non-reproduction etiological theory could ascribe proper functions to an item because the item is intended by a designer to be used for a certain purpose. Such a theory straightforwardly satisfies the novelty desideratum D4, since there is no qualitative difference between standard and innovative items; but the theory does not satisfy the physical structure desideratum D3. In this theory all that is needed to ascribe a function to an artefact is that its designer intended it to be used for a purpose. The ascription of functions is independent from the actual physical structure of the artefact involved. Hence, one cannot infer from the function ascription any belief that the physical structure is such that it can perform that function. Summing up, non-reproduction etiological theories can satisfy the novelty desideratum D4, but do not always satisfy the physical structure desideratum D3.
This problem with accounting for physical structure may be a reason to rethink the shift to non-reproduction theories. Perhaps, one may argue, it was unwise to reject reproduction theories. After all, these theories are the most widely held and most fine-grained theories of functions on offer in the literature. Yet the problem with handling cases of innovation stems from the very nature of reproduction theories, namely their insistence on an underlying reproduction history. Therefore, the only way to guarantee that they can handle cases of innovation is to combine them in some way with a theory that can. In general, there appear to be two ways of successfully achieving such a hybridisation within the technical domain. On the one hand, one may try to supplement etiological theories with a theory of functions that can handle innovations. This can be called a 'disjunctive' strategy. On the other hand, one may try to embed etiological theories in a theory of functions that can handle innovations; this is an 'embedding' strategy. Both strategies are rather flexible, so that hybridisation is hard to criticise in general, but we can make two remarks about these strategies. First of all, neither is watertight. The disjunctive strategy may run into problems by combining the disadvantages of both theories and the embedding strategy by taking away advantages of the embedded theory. Secondly, and more generally, hybridisation is a second-best option as long as there still are more unified etiological theories for the technical domain. Since our argument only puts constraints on intentionalist non-reproduction theories and does not reject them outright, this best option appears to be still available.
An immediate response to the arguments in this section may be that our presentation of etiological theories and hybridisations is too general. Failures to meet the desiderata D1 to D4 might simply disappear once we consider the details of the relevant theories. In the remaining sections of this paper, we therefore discuss some important existing theories to show that our arguments apply to them. This discussion will follow the order of our criticisms in this section: we start by considering reproduction theories in Section 5, then turn to non-reproduction theories in Section 6, and finally review an example of each strategy of hybridisation in Section 7.
The failure of existing reproduction theories
We start our review of existing etiological theories by discussing and assessing reproduction theories. As said earlier, this type of theory is the most widely held and most fine-grained type found in the literature, probably because etiological theories originated in the biological domain. Many of the most recent reproduction theories are limited to this domain; we therefore focus on the work of two of the founding figures of the etiological theory of functions, Karen Neander and Ruth Garrett Millikan. Their theories can be divided into reproduction and non-reproduction parts, and it is fair to say that they primarily intend the non-reproduction parts to apply to the technical domain. Yet for the sake of completeness and to collect some elements necessary for evaluating the non-reproduction parts of Neander's and Millikan's theories in the next section, we start by considering the reproduction parts of their theories.
The etiological theory of functions proposed by Neander ([1991a Neander ([ ], [1991b ) is explicitly meant as conceptual analysis in the sense of 'a search for the criteria of application that people generally have in mind when they use the term under analysis' ([1991a] , p. 171). Neander proposes a general definition of proper functions and develops it for biological traits in ([1991a] ). In a second paper ([1991b] ) she also sketches an application of her definition to the technical domain.
Neander's general definition of a proper function, 'the proper function of a trait is to do whatever it was selected for' ([1991a] , p. 173), is obviously built on a notion of 'selection'. Within the biological domain this terms has an unambiguous meaning due to neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory: selection is natural selection, it presupposes populations, and it discriminates between alternative items and traits. Selection causes traits to vanish or to remain present in the population, and selection causes traits to outnumber eventually the alternatives or to remain rare. So for the biological domain Neander specifies her general definition as follows:
It is the/a proper function of an item (X) of an organism (O) to do that which items of X's type did to contribute to the inclusive fitness of O's ancestors, and which caused the genotype, of which X is the phenotypic expression, to be selected by natural selection. ([1991a] , p. 174)
Neander's theory of functions may be taken as an example of a reproduction etiological theory. By placing a biological item I within the framework of neoDarwinian evolution, I obtains a causal history that comprises its ancestors A, A 0 , . . . and bits of DNA as the genetic codes i, a, a 0 , . . . of I and of these ancestors, respectively. This causal history satisfies the three requirements R1 to R3 of a genetic reproduction history, as described in Section 3.2, if one, as we shall do, ignores violations of the counterfactual genetic reproduction requirement R3 due to sexual reproduction.
11 Finally, the functions Neander ascribes to I are reproduced dispositions possessed by the ancestors of I, which causally contributed to that I coming into existence instead of being selected against. The same goes for Ruth Millikan's theory, which is at first glance rather more complicated. It primarily and fundamentally ascribes proper functions to items that are members of 'reproductively established families' (henceforth simply called 'families'), i.e., kinds of which the members are related by 'reproduction'. These proper functions are called 'direct'.
Reproduction is defined as a direct causal relation between items or their properties, which leads to a counterfactual-supporting similarity, so that Millikan's theory appears to satisfy R3. To allow for malformed items, Millikan allows a final member that only approximately resembles other ones. If, for earlier members of such a family, there is a positive correlation between the reproduced similarity (the 'character') and a certain capacity of the members, and the existence of a present member can be explained on the basis of this positive correlation, the capacity is called a 'direct proper function' of the present member.
As indicated in Section 3, insisting on direct reproduction would discredit many biological items, such as eyes and hearts, from membership of a family. Therefore, Millikan introduces a distinction between first-order families, to which counterfactual-supporting similarity applies, and higher-order families. Just like the members of a first-order family, those of a higher-order family should have some properties in common, but this similarity need not support counterfactuals. So this part of the theory satisfies R2, which is slightly more liberal in requiring only pairwise similarity. The first-order and higher-order levels are connected as follows: if a set of entities is the product of a set of members of a lower-order family, the proper function of which is to produce such entities, they are called a higher-order family. The definition is more involved than it is presented here, for Millikan also allows the possibility of production of members of a higher-order family by a single entity, the proper function of which is to produce similar items. Yet, clearly, this connection between families paints a picture similar to that of the genetic reproduction scheme R1.
Are these reproduction theories applicable to the technical domain? We have already argued that as soon as a reproduction theory is transposed from its standard domain of biology to that of technology, it should be an intentionalist theory instead of a non-intentionalist one. Can the theories of Neander and Millikan make this shift? It seems they can, for both authors have indicated ways of making it. Nevertheless, we believe that both theories, even if they can be plausibly cast as intentionalist reproduction ones, fail for the technical domain. Both theories satisfy the proper versus accidental and malfunction desiderata as all reproduction theories do, and may satisfy the physical structure desideratum (see Section 4). Yet, just like those theories, they cannot handle cases of innovation. For Neander's theory, the most important condition of application to technology is finding a relevant notion of 'selection' to describe technical artefacts. Within the context of a reproduction theory, two alternatives come to mind. Selection may be interpreted as a direct technical analogue of natural selection. In this respect, Neander ([1991b] , n. 11) mentions the trialand-error type of selection by artisans who copy artefacts that are thought to be successful, without having a full understanding of the reasons for this success. An illustration of this may be the production of metals in prehistoric times. Alternatively, selection could refer to the interplay of market forces that influence the decisions of the users of artefacts. In this way, computers replaced typewriters in late twentieth-century offices. In either case, selection operates on the level of types of artefacts and over relatively long periods. As a consequence, a unique item that is the result of a temporally brief design process cannot be regarded as the product of selection. In other words, prototypes of innovative artefacts, which are neither the result of trial and error nor the outcome of market forces, do not have a proper function.
Millikan's theory can accommodate intentional actions, although her commitment to naturalism appears to preclude a necessary appeal to intentionality at the basic level of function ascriptions. Some examples of first-order families given by Millikan in fact involve intentional agents, such as a family of household screwdrivers ([1984] , p. 23). Let's take the example at face value and accept that Millikan's reproduction etiological theory may be intentionalist. Even then, the ascription of functions to artefact goes awry. For remember that it is a necessary condition for ascribing direct proper functions to items that they are members of a family. Can artefacts be members of first-order families? Take a recent specimen of a type of paperclip. This is not related to its ancestors in a counterfactual-supporting way: many changes wrought in an ancestor, such as bending or scratching, are usually not transferred to descendants. Instead, reproduction of most artefacts involves abstraction to those features that are thought to be essential to fulfilling their function.
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This leaves the possibility of counting artefacts as members of a higherorder family. This family should be based on a lower-order family via the proper function of the members of the latter. This leads to the assumption of the existence of artefact-genes. This does not sit well with an important aspect of Millikan's own theory. Remember that members of families should be similar. Again, consider paperclips, which are rather varied in appearance and basic mechanism: for example, some consist of nested U-turns, others of two little connected metal plates. Millikan's definition would force us to distinguish at least two families of paperclips and to denote an innovative specimen as a malformed one, even if it is not malfunctioning. Furthermore, truly innovative artefacts have ex hypothesi no feature in common with other items. So they cannot be regarded as members of any family, since some approximate similarity to ancestors is needed for them to classify as malformed. Even if there is such similarity, Millikan's theory may lead us astray. Take the Britannia Bridge, which has spanned the Menai Strait between the northwest of Wales and the island Anglesey since the 1850s. 13 On this bridge, regarded as highly innovative in its days, trains travelled through a horizontal, hollow iron tube, upheld by piers. William Fairbairn, a designer with ample experience in building ship hulls, tested more than thirty models of the tube, with different cross-sections. So what function did the eventual tube of the Britannia Bridge have? In Millikan's reproduction theory, its only ancestors were the unsuccessful prototypes and, eventually, Fairbairn's ship hulls. Yet surely the function of the railway bridge was to make possible railway traffic across a body of water, not to withstand water pressure while keeping the bridge afloat.
The failure of existing non-reproduction theories
In the previous section, we argued that applying standard etiological theories to the technical domain cannot just involve a shift from the standard nonintentionalist reproduction theories to intentionalist reproduction theories. It seems that Neander and Millikan acknowledge this point, although probably not for the same reasons as ours. In response, they have both formulated an intentionalist non-reproduction theory, more or less specifically for the technical domain. In this section, we discuss these theories and argue that they run afoul of the physical structure desideratum D3. Recall Neander's general definition of proper functions: 'the proper function of a trait is to do whatever it was selected for' ([1991a] , p. 173). As an alternative to the trial-and-error procedures or selection by market forces of the reproduction theory, selection may be interpreted as a one-shot process that operates on the level of individual artefacts over short periods of time due to decisions of individual agents. During design, an engineer selects specific technical solutions from a set of alternatives. Neander chooses this token interpretation when she offers her theory of functions for the technical domain-which is far less detailed than that for the biological domain:
I suggest that the function of an artifact is the purpose or end for which it was designed, made, or (minimally) put in place or retained by an agent. ([1991b], p. 462) On this interpretation of selection, the causal history ch(I ) of a technical artefact necessarily includes intentional behaviour by agents-designing, making or retaining-and does not satisfy the requirements R1 to R3. It, for instance, violates R1, because there need not be ancestors of an item. This is illustrated by a digression on the above definition for technical functions: Also, because intentional agents do have foresight, there need be no past performances of the functional effect, nor any 'ancestral' artifacts to do any performing. It is enough [. . .] if the designer believes or hopes that the artifact will have the desired effect and selects it for that purpose. ([1991b], p. 462) Hence, this is an intentionalist non-reproduction etiological theory of technical functions.
Millikan's way of shifting from reproduction to non-reproduction theories is, again, more involved than Neander's. She introduces a further distinction in her theory of functions, namely between direct and derived proper functions. Membership of a family is a necessary condition for ascribing a direct proper function to an item. There is no such condition for derived proper functions. The notion is best explained by means of an example from biology. The skin of a chameleon is equipped with a colouring mechanism, i.e., a mechanism that redistributes pigments. This mechanism has a direct proper function: earlier chameleons had a similar mechanism, which was reproduced because of a positive correlation between it and a survivalenhancing performance. This direct proper function is a relational one, namely to turn the chameleon's skin the same colour as its environment. This relational (direct) proper function of the mechanism can be used to define the function of items it produces; in this case, the specific colours that the chameleon turns. A specific colour need not be a member of a reproductive family of any order: it might well be the first token ever of this colour in chameleons-and we do not want to include it in a family of non-chameleons. Yet it is produced by a device that has a relational proper function. In that way, we may say that the specific colour has the derived proper function to hide the chameleon in a specific environment.
The theory of derived proper functions does not satisfy our constraints on reproduction theories. In particular, the item to which the function is ascribed does not need to have a feature in common with other items. So even in those cases in which one can speak of ancestors of the item, R2 is violated. Derived proper functions are ascribed on the basis of an item's causal history, namely its production by an item that has a direct proper function. So the theory of derived proper functions is an example of a non-reproduction theory. Moreover, it leaves room for intentions, since there are no constraints on the nature of the production process involved.
According to Millikan, 'all tools have as derived proper functions the functions that their designers intended for them ' ([1984] , p. 49). Any artefact is a product of a system that has been reproduced, namely the intentional system of human agents. In fact, one of the main advantages Millikan claims for her theory of biosemantics is that it is able to account for intentionality in a naturalistic way. Here, it suffices to say that she claims that intentionality and deliberation, as constellations of desires and beliefs, arise as a product of evolutionary pressure towards true beliefs and realisable desires. Let us accept this account-which is more important for the unity of Millikan's theory than for its application to the technical domain anyway-and see where it takes us with respect to artefacts. If we are to ascribe derived proper functions to artefacts in accordance with this intentionalist theory, they must stand in an analogous relation to the intentional system as does the specific colour to the chameleon's colouring mechanism. However, this relation is clearly not analogous: the intentional system primarily produces particular desires and beliefs, and artefacts only through these. Moreover, the chameleon's skin mechanism necessarily performs its function by producing a particular colour, but the intentional system can perform its function without producing artefacts, for instance by instigating immediate action. Millikan seems aware of this problem. She argues as follows: particular desires have derived proper functions as products of the intentional system. Their proper function is to get themselves fulfilled. Artefacts are the products of desires that have the proper function to get themselves fulfilled using artefacts. Hence, she claims, artefacts also have derived proper functions.
14 If the argument in Section 4 is correct, both of these theories may fail to satisfy the physical structure desideratum D3. Let us first evaluate Neander's etiological theory for the technical domain with respect to the four desiderata. It satisfies the proper versus accidental desideratum D1 if normal use of the artefact is taken as use for the purpose or end for which it was designed, made or retained, and if accidental functions of an artefact are taken as all other purposes for which it can be used. 15 The theory also satisfies the malfunction and novelty desiderata D2 and D4: an artefact designed for a purpose is ascribed a function even if use of the artefact never results in achieving this purpose, and the right proper functions are ascribed to innovative or atypical artefacts because the definition refers to the reasons for which these artefacts were designed. As expected, however, Neander's theory fails to satisfy the physical structure desideratum D3, because her function ascription does not introduce any structural conditions: it is sufficient that an agent (minimally) retains an artefact for some purpose to ascribe to it the corresponding function, and this does not justify the belief that the physical structure is such that it can perform that function. Assessing Millikan's theory leads to broadly similar results. Let us ignore for the moment that the connection between designer's intentions and the functions of artefacts is not as tight as Millikan suggests, 16 and that her etiological theory offers no indications on how to obtain a more satisfactory connection-although we do not deny the connection between artefacts and intentions and we have no quarrel with the idea of an evolutionary underpinning of intentionality. Leaving this aside, we can remark that Millikan's theory satisfies D1, D2, and D4 in the same way as Neander's theory: the designer's intentions serve to distinguish proper and accidental functions and serve as a basis for ascribing functions to malfunctioning and innovative artefacts. Ascribing a function to an artefact just because it is the product of a desire that has the proper function to get itself fulfilled using the artefact seems all too easy: it provides no way of deriving conditions on the physical structure of the artefact which justify that it can perform the ascribed function. Only a desire that has some chance of being satisfied would, and to distinguish these desires from unfeasible ones requires a connection with beliefs about the physical world. As it stands, Millikan's theory of derived proper functions does not satisfy the physical structure desideratum D3.
Improving reproduction by hybridisation
Combining the conclusions of Sections 5 and 6, we can say that the standard etiological theories of Neander and Millikan fail for the technical domain, as anticipated in Section 4. Perhaps this failure is not too surprising for other reasons than ours. A large part of the recent literature on functions is taken up by criticisms of the standard etiological theories, both as general theories of function and as theories for the biological domain. So it might seem that we have just added to the chorus a complaint concerning the technical domain. We do not discuss these other criticisms. Instead, we focus on some recent attempts to improve the standard etiological theories, to find out whether they have managed to improve the application to the technical domain. Many recent contributions to the theory of functions, in biology as well as in general, seek to combine etiological theories with a traditional rival, namely Cummins' functional analysis, originally proposed in a famous paper (Cummins [1975] ). Here, we take two of these attempts-the 'pluralist' theory of Beth Preston ([1998] ) and the 'natural norms' theory of Paul Sheldon Davies ([2000 Davies ([ ], [2001 ). These exemplify the two hybridisation strategies mentioned in Section 4, namely the disjunctive and the embedding strategy respectively. Both attempt to improve the etiological account as a general, though disjunctive or embedded, theory of functions. By showing that these hybridisations fail, we want to make plausible our conclusion that the technical domain needs its own, intentionalist non-reproduction etiological theory instead of a modified general one.
Before we turn to the hybridisation attempts, it is worthwhile discussing briefly Cummins' original proposal. According to him, all function statements can be analysed as parts of 'functional analyses', which have the following form:
x functions as a j in s (or: the function of x in s is to j) relative to an analytical account A of s's capacity to c just in case x is capable of j-ing in s and A appropriately and adequately accounts for s's capacity to c by, in part, appealing to the capacity of x to j in s. ([1975], p. 762) In other words: functions are those actual activities of an item that are causal contributions to the activity of a more encompassing system, as explained by an analytical account. Thus, the function of the heart is to pump blood because this is its causal contribution to the activity of the cardiovascular system, as explained by physiology, and the function of the hour-hand of a clock is to indicate the hours, in a mechanical explanation of the working of the clock.
It is standardly argued that, as a general theory of functions, this 'systems approach' is both too liberal and too strict. It is too liberal in not putting sufficient restrictions on the embedding systems. Thus, it is the function of the sun to cause skin cancer, since there are analytical accounts in which this is the causal contribution of the sun to the development of skin tumours. On the other hand, it is too strict since it focuses exclusively on actual activities of an item. According to the systems approach, it would make no sense to say that the function of John's broken stepladder from Section 2 is to be stood on, which is surely counterintuitive. In other words: Cummins' account satisfies neither the malfunction nor the proper versus accidental desiderata. This being said, let us turn to the recent amendments of reproduction theories.
In a recent paper, Beth Preston has criticised Millikan for attempting to reduce all function ascriptions to a monolithic etiological theory. She especially targets Millikan's theory of derived proper functions as an inconsistent expansion of the theory of direct proper functions (Preston [1998], pp. 234-9) . The inconsistency arises because, according to Preston, direct proper functions are permanent and normative, whereas derived proper functions are temporary and non-normative. She therefore offers a rival theory, intended to be genuinely pluralist. This theory boils down to retaining the normative direct proper functions and replacing derived proper functions with 'system functions'. 18 Preston credits Cummins with pointing out the importance of these functions in several contexts and she welcomes their lack of normative aspects. According to her, system functions can be ascribed to those objects that are used in a novel, idiosyncratic, or unintended context, such as tires used as swings, soft-drink bottles used as bird feeders, etc. These functions are not 'proper', since they are ascribed independently of the causal history of the item, and they cannot be ascribed to malfunctioning items. Therefore, according to Preston, they cannot be reduced to direct proper functions, pace Millikan. Instead, she adds them as a second, independent type to her pluralist theory to increase the scope of the etiological theory as a conceptual analysis and to avoid the alleged inconsistency in Millikan's theory. Preston claims that 'although both the biological realm and the artifactual realm display the same two types of function, they differ markedly in the distribution of these types across the range of functional phenomena' ([1998] Another attempt at improving the etiological theory exemplifies the embedding strategy by proposing a complete 'systematisation' of proper functions. In some recent publications, Paul Sheldon Davies has argued that etiological theories are really a kind of system functions. 19 The details of this attempt at integration are irrelevant to our purposes. Suffice it to say that Davies argues that changes in a species, due to natural selection, can be analysed in terms of the contribution of traits. These traits explain the reproduction rates of different 'parts' of the 'system', where sets of individuals with different reproduction rates are the parts and the entire species the system. According to Davies, An immediate worry regarding both attempts at improving the etiological theory is that they could make the improved accounts vulnerable to the standard objection to Cummins' theory of functions. In Davies' case, the problem arises in a straightforward manner. Since he subordinates proper functions to system functions, and system functions do not satisfy the malfunction desideratum, he cannot ascribe functions to any malfunctioning artefact and he cannot make the distinction between proper and accidental functions. Quite surprisingly, Davies admits these problems, but refuses to regard them as a fatal objection to his theory. He claims that etiological theories did not satisfy the malfunction desideratum in the first place, so that there is no harm done in subordinating them to Cummins' functional analysis (Davies [2000] , p. 94). He waves aside the proper-accidental distinction by saying that there is no need to discriminate functional and useful characteristics ([2000] , p. 103). The latter claim is simply unsupported and thus amounts to hand waving, and the former appears to be a tu quoque fallacy. After all, if neither etiological theories nor Cummins' account satisfies the malfunction desideratum, this only goes to show that there is as yet no adequate general theory of functions. In this paper, we argue that standard etiological theories cannot be regarded as adequate to the technical domain, and leave to Davies the stronger conclusion that there are no adequate general theories of function.
In general, pluralist theories such as Preston's have the advantage of all disjunctions: they offer greater scope if the cases on which one disjunct fails are properly covered by another, and they offer this at the small price of conceptual disunity. However, pluralist theories still fail if there are cases for which all disjuncts fail simultaneously. For Preston's theory, this last failure occurs for cases of innovative but malfunctioning artefacts. This class of malfunctioning innovative artefact may be numerically small compared to other classes of artefacts, but is conceptually of considerable importance. The production of innovative prototypes, many of which will be malfunctioning at instances, is a standard element of most design processes. Since the aim of this process is to produce a functional object, not being able to ascribe functions to unsuccessful products would be unacceptable. To account for these cases, say of the first teleprinter, Preston needs to eliminate the innovative element; if this succeeds, reproduction etiological theories can be used to ascribe functions to malfunctioning prototypes. 20 This may be possible, but it requires a substantial amount of historical reconstruction. In
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this respect, an intentionalist non-reproduction alternative would be at least much more simple.
Conclusions
In this paper we have considered etiological theories of functions for the domain of technical artefacts. On the basis of some aspects of the phenomenology of artefact use, we have introduced four desiderata for a theory of artefact functions. We have classified etiological theories in general by means of two distinctions: reproduction versus non-reproduction and intentionalist versus non-intentionalist etiological theories. In this classification, the standard etiological theories for biological items, based on neoDarwinian evolutionary theory, are non-intentionalist reproduction theories. Etiological theories for artefacts, however, are either intentionalist reproduction or intentionalist non-reproduction theories. We have given a general argument to prove that reproduction theories fail to satisfy one of our desiderata, namely to ascribe the right proper functions to innovative or atypical artefacts. Hence, a non-intentionalist reproduction etiological theory for the biological domain is only successfully transposed to the technical domain, if it is transformed into an intentionalist and non-reproduction etiological theory. We have also argued, however, that this type of theory may fail to satisfy another desideratum by ascribing functions to an artefact independently of the physical structure of that artefact. We have illustrated these negative results by means of the standard etiological theories developed by Neander and Millikan. When these theories are transposed from the biological to the technical domain, they become either reproduction etiological theories (Millikan's theory of direct proper functions) or intentionalist non-reproduction theories (Neander's theory and Millikan's theory of derived proper functions). All these candidate theories of functions for artefacts are untenable as conceptual analyses. Finally, we have discussed theories of functions proposed by Preston and Davies. These theories attempt to save (reproduction) etiological accounts as general theories of functions by combining them in different ways with Cummins' theory of functions. They do not satisfy all desiderata for a theory of functions of technical artefacts because they inherit some of the problems of Cummins' theory.
Our results leave open the possibility of a successful etiological theory for the technical domain. We conclude our paper with some tentative remarks about the form that such a theory could take.
Our arguments show that a tenable etiological theory for the technical domain is necessarily an intentionalist non-reproduction theory, but not just any such theory; a theory which ascribes functions to an artefact on the basis only of the intentions of the agents that designed it does not meet the physical structure desideratum. So this desideratum puts additional constraints on an intentionalist non-reproduction theory for the technical domain.
From the perspective of the design of artefacts, this need for additional constraints does not come as a surprise. One can hardly imagine that engineers and designers would be taught to design artefacts capable of performing a specific function, with the aid of nothing but their sincere intentions that it should perform this function. Clearly, design involves more than good intentions. For instance, designers apply all kinds of technological and scientific knowledge to 'find a suitable geometrical and physico-chemical form for the product and its parts, so that the given function, or functions, can be fulfilled' (Roozenburg and Eekels [1995] , p. 53). Not every geometrical and physico-chemical form is suitable, so technological and scientific knowledge already introduce conditions on the physical structure of the artefact that is designed to perform the specified function. Moreover, designers are capable of providing explanations, based on this knowledge, as to why an artefact with a given physical structure can perform a specific function.
An intentionalist non-reproduction etiological theory that takes into account these features of the design process may go a long way towards being a successful theory of functions for the technical domain. 21 Consider a theory that ascribes a function to an artefact on three conditions: (1) the designers intended to design the artefact to have the function, (2) these designers determined the physical structure of that artefact on the basis of their technological and scientific knowledge, and (3) by means of this knowledge, they can provide explanations as to why the artefact with the thus-determined physical structure can perform the function. Such a theory is still etiological since it ascribes functions on the basis of the design history. Moreover, it seems to satisfy the desiderata for a tenable theory of functions. It satisfies, for instance, the physical structure desideratum: by the inclusion of knowledge and explanations it entails that the artefact has to satisfy structural conditions to perform the function for which it is designed; if a function is ascribed to an artefact, the use of this knowledge and the existence of explanations guarantee to a large extent that the artefact satisfies these conditions. The theory also satisfies the malfunction desideratum: the artefact may actually have a physical structure that does not satisfy the structural conditions implied by the used knowledge (the artefact may be ill-designed or be manufactured incorrectly), or the used knowledge may be insufficient (the explanation of how the artefact can perform the ascribed function is then invalid). Yet this theory leaves sufficient opportunity for improvement. One could, for instance, replace the direct reference to the intentions of designers by a reference to plans, following a more general suggestion by Michael Bratman ([1987] ). In Houkes, Vermaas, Dorst and de Vries ([2002] ), we have given a conceptual framework for such an improved theory of functions. In this framework, artefact design is described in terms of two nested plans: design is a planned activity to contribute to a user plan for achieving certain goals; use is described as the execution of a user plan. This plan may involve the use of objects, and if these objects are not readily available to potential users, the designers design these objects along with the development of the user plan. Technical artefacts are objects designed in such a planned process. The resulting intentionalist non-reproduction etiological theory ascribes functions to these artefacts relative to the user plan: the function of an artefact is the role it has in the user plan, provided that this user plan has been developed in accordance with the rules of proper and successful design.
So our final word is that if one wants to arrive at an etiological theory of functions tenable as conceptual analysis for the technical domain, one needs to look at this domain. An uninformed transposal of the standard etiological accounts from the biological to the technical domain does not lead to satisfactory results, but there are good reasons to suppose that etiological theories that start by focusing on the design process could be tenable. As said at the outset, existing etiological theories apply relatively straightforwardly to the biological domain, and we have given no arguments to doubt this application. Our challenge to the proponents of etiological theories is to develop a specific account for the technical domain.
